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disability is partial. The Industrial Accident Commission takes the position that " 'penna' as used in l1abor Code Section
only as meaning having disability
at less than 100%." The applicant urges
to sustaining a subsequent injury,
of 100 per cent may nevertheless (when
services for which he is receiving
for
injury compensathc commission is of the view that by
of the statute it is precluded, insofar as applying
Fund provisions is concerned, from
as
disabled an employe who has been rated
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in Yiew of the objectives of the legislation,
from the Subsequent Injuries Fund
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in the light of the undisputed eYidence that he was working
and earning wages. This eontention, in the form in which
it is stated, is iueorreet. [2] It is settled law in this Rtate
that an employe may receive a permanent
of 100 per cent and be entitled to the
iiH'i(1ent to sneh rating although he is 11 b1e to retnrn to
work <It the wages lw receiY0d before the
which eausrcl
is not lost
disability. [3] "I'I'lhe rir1:ht to
or diminished by the injured employee's return to work at
the same or a (liffcrent wage than that theretofore earned
by him. The statute dnes not require a
of loss of
0arning powc'r as a prerequisite to the
tion for a permanent c!isability, but, on the
for the payment in installments of a fixed and definite sum
of mon<>y thenofor." (Postal Tcl.-Cable Co. v. Industrial
. . lee. Com. (Hl81). 213 Cal. 544. 550 [3 P.2cl Gl; see also
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:JS [ 1i)rJ P. ];)()] ; JJ[crcury A1Jiation Co. v. Inclush·ial Ace.
Com. (1921), JBG Cal. 375, 877 [199 P. 508};
of
J[ofor Yehiclrs v. Industrial _4cc. Com. (
14 Cal.2d
180, 191. 194
P.2d 181].) We
for the rem:ons herei11after explained, that it is
<Wd clesirable to distinguish between a formula or ruleesta hl ishrcl "100 per ePnt rl isability" for certain
pnr-

:no

8srrrn

1'.

with the
In the circumstances it appears
dically proper to
the words ''
ability'' as used in section
ing its benefits to the disabled
properly be rated at 100 per cent
for the basic form of vvorkmen 's
his earning power has not in
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it should be at least
penetrate the fiction of 100
the truth of his remaining
truth of a subsequent
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For the reasons above stated the order of the commission is
annulled and the matter is remanded for further proc1:lectmgs
consistent with the views
in this nnn'''"n
Gibson, C. J., Shenk,
Spence, J., concurred.

,J.,
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CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached
the
majority, but in the interest of
of decision I
deem it advisable to call attention to the
in the
reasoning upon which the
here is based and
the reasoning of the majority in the cases of
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 37 Cal.2d 215
P.2d
, Aetna
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 38 Cal.2d 599
P.2d
and Garcia v. InclustTial Ace.
41 Cal.2d 689
8 J, in all of which last eitrd eases I dissented. In the last
eited cases the mandate of liberal construetion of the identical
statutes here under consideration contained in Labor Code
section 3202 was ignored by the
Had this mandate
been followed the result in the last cited cases would have
been favorable to the disabled
it
this case.

